Abstract -Due to the massive existing vulnerabilities in mobile ad-hoc networks, they may be insecure against attacks by the malicious nodes. In this paper we have analyzed the effects of Black hole attack on mobile ad hoc routing protocols. Mainly two protocols AODV and Improved AODV have been considered. Simulation has been performed on the basis of performance parameters and effect has been analyzed after adding Black-hole nodes in the network. Finally the results have been computed and compared to stumble on which protocol is least affected by these attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is an independent system of mobile routers attached by wireless links. The routers move freely and organize themselves randomly. The network topology may change rapidly and spontaneously. Such a network may operate in an individual fashion or may be connected to the Internet. Multi hop, mobility, large network size combined with device heterogeneity, bandwidth and battery power constrain make the design of passable routing protocols a major challenge. In recent years, a lot of routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs, out of whom two major protocols AODV and Improved AODV have been discussed in this paper.
II. MANET CHARACTERISTICS

Autonomous and infrastructure less:
MANET is a self-organized network, independent of any established infrastructure and centralized network administration. Each node acts as a router and operates in distributed manner.
Multi-hop routing: Since there exists no dedicated router, so every node also acts as a router and aids in forwarding packets to the intended destination. Hence, information sharing among mobile nodes is made available.
Dynamic network topology: Since MANET nodes move randomly in the network, the topology of MANET changes frequently, leading to regular route changes, network partitions, and possibly packet losses.
Variation on link and node capabilities: Every participating node in an ad hoc network is equipped with different type of radio devices having varying transmission and receiving capabilities. They all operate on multiple frequency bands. Asymmetric links may be formed due to this heterogeneity in the radio capabilities.
Energy-constrained operation: The processing power of node is restricted because the batteries carried by portable mobile devices have limited power supply.
k scalability: A wide range of MANET applications may involve bulky networks with plenty of nodes especially that can be found in strategic networks. Scalability is crucial to the flourishing operation of MANET.
III. MANET APPLICATIONS
There are many applications of MANETs. Some of them are discussed below.
Military Networks: The latest digital military fields demand strong and consistent communication in different forms. Mostly devices are deployed in moving military vehicles, tanks, trucks etc which can share information randomly among them.
Sensor Networks: One more application of MANETs is the Sensor Networks. It is a network which consists of a large number of devices or nodes called sensors, which sense a particular incoming signal and transmit it to appropriate destination node.
Automotive Applications: Automotive networks are extensively discussed currently. Vehicles should be enabled to communicate on the road with each other and with traffic lights forming ad-hoc networks of diverse sizes. This network will provide drivers with information about the road conditions, traffic congestions and accident-ahead warnings which help in optimizing the traffic flow.
Emergency services: Ad hoc networks are broadly being used in rescue operations for disaster relief efforts during floods, earthquakes, etc. Ad hoc on demand distance-vector protocol is a pure reactive protocol and it incorporates the features of both DSDV and DSR. AODV was proposed by Perkins et al. as advancement to the earlier protocol DSDV. DSDV is purely proactive protocol based on the traditional Bellman -Ford algorithm. In contrast AODV is ondemand in which route is established only when it is required. The routing in AODV is accomplished in two phases: route discovery and route maintenance as discussed below.
Route Discovery: Route discovery process is initiated whenever a node needs to send data packet to the destination and there is no valid route available in its routing table. The source node then broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet to all its neighbor nodes, which then forward the request to their neighbor nodes and the process repeats as shown in figure 3 . Each node is assigned a sequence no. and a broadcast ID which is incremented each time the node issues a RREQ packet. The broadcast ID together with the node‗s IP address, exclusively identifies a RREQ [3] which is unique in nature. The RREQ packet contains following fields:
-Sequence number of RREQ -Broadcast ID -The most recent sequence number of the destination Upon receiving RREQ by a node which is either destination node or an intermediate node with a fresh route to destination, it replies by unicasting a route reply (RREP) message to the source node. As the RREP is routed back along the reverse path, intermediate nodes along this path set up forward path entries to the destination in their routing tables. When the RREP reaches source node, a route from source to destination node is established. Figure 2 indicates the path of the RREP from the destination node to the source node [9] . Route Maintenance: Once a route is established between source and destination, it needs maintenance usually at the source end. When any link break or failure is detected, it is declared as invalid and a route error (RERR) message is flooded to all the nodes in the network. These nodes in turn broadcast the RERR to their ancestor nodes and so on till the influenced source node. Then it is the source node who may decide whether to stop sending data or restart the route 
VI. IMPROVED AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL
It is an enhanced version of AODV and is hybrid in nature. IAODV mainly integrates two features: Multipath and Path accumulation as explained below [20] .
Multipath: Multipath AODV reduces the route discovery frequency as compared to single path AODV. It finds multiple paths between a source and a destination in a route discovery process. Single path AODV initiates a new route discovery when it detects one path failure to the destination, whereas in multipath it creates a fresh route in case all the existing routes fail or expire. It also reduces the number of similar routes between source and destination nodes. A path with most similar nodes has a higher probability to create common links.
Path accumulation: Path accumulation feature enables us to append all discovered paths between source and destination nodes to the control messages as shown in figure 3 (a). Hence, at any intermediate node the route request (RREQ) packet contains a list of all nodes traversed. Each node receiving these control messages updates its routing table. It adds paths to each node contained in these messages. 
Types of IAODV operations
Route discovery: Route discovery as shown in figure  3 (b) includes a route request message (RREQ) and route reply message (RREP). Suppose Node 2 wants to communicate with Node 9. Each node forwarding the RREQ creates a reverse route to 2 used when sending back the RREP. When sending back the RREP, nodes on the reverse route create routes to node 9. Route maintenance: It includes a Route Error message (RERR). Route maintenance is a process of responding to topology update which can happen after a route has been initially created. To maintain these paths, the nodes continuously examine the active links and update the valid timeout field of entries in its routing table during data transfer. If a node receives a data packet for a destination it does not have a valid route for, it must reply with a RERR message. When creating the RERR message, the node makes a list containing the address and sequence number of the unapproachable node. Then the node updates all the entries in routing table. The key purpose is to notify about all the additional routes being created during discovery phase that are no longer available. The node then sends a list in the RERR packet which is broadcasted in the network. This distribution process is illustrated in figure 3(c) . The link between nodes 6 and 9 breaks, and node 6 generates an RERR. Only nodes having a route table entry for node 9 propagate the RERR message further. Table 1 shows the comparison between the two protocols. MANETs often experience unusual security attacks because of their following features such as dynamically changing topology, lack of central monitoring, mutual algorithms and absence of a centralized certification authority etc. Generally mobile ad hoc networks are affected by two kinds of attacks which are classified as passive and active. Passive attacks do not affect the functionality of network, but may attempt to find out vital information by listening to traffic [16] . It is difficult to identify such attacks as under these attacks the network operates normally. These attacks basically obtain critical routing information through sniffing. Such attacks are usually complex to identify and protection against such attacks is also difficult. Moreover, it is sometimes not even possible to trace the exact location of the attacker node. Generally, such type of attacks is prevented with the help of encryption. On the other hand, active attacks aim to modify the transmitted data by adding random packets and force to interrupt the operation of network. The main purpose is to pull all packets towards the attacker for analysis or to obstruct the network communication. Such attacks can be detected and the nodes can be identified.
Passive attacks can be debarred using various encryption mechanisms. Only active attacks can be accepted out at routing level. These can either be inner outer. Inner attacks can be passive and active. Passive attacks are unauthorized disruption of the routing packets and active attack is from outside sources to degrade or damage message flow within the network nodes [17] . In order to combat these attacks a secure ad hoc environment should provide confidentially, integrity, authenticity, availability and non-repudiation. The following are few attacks based on routing mechanisms [19] .
Black Hole: It is a network layer attack in which all the packets are dropped by sending fake packets. The attacker node advertises itself and declares having the shortest path to the destination. All the nodes start forwarding packets to this node and then the malicious node just drops all the incoming packets. Black hole attack mainly attacks AODV protocol.
Worm Hole: It is also a network layer attack in which two malicious nodes that is part of foreign private network record packets at one location in the network, rebroadcast them to another location through their private network and retransmits them into the network [2] . Table 2 below shows the defence against various attacks on MANETS. Every secure solution aims to resolve the network attacks by escalating the secrecy of network through encryption techniques. In SAODV and SEAD, hash function is used to authenticate the hop count [19] .
It maintains authenticity on end-to-end basis, using symmetric key cryptography. It can authenticate routing messages using either shared secret keys or digital signatures. ARAN relies on a trusted certificate server. Every node forwarding a Route Request or Reply is required to sign the packet. It detects and protects against malicious actions carried out by 3rd party and peers. SAODV suggests using digital signatures to authenticate nonmutable data in an end-to-end manner. Hash chains are used to secure mutable fields such as hop count. It is an extension to AODV Routing Protocol. Packet Leashes have been proposed to detect and defend the wormhole attacks in ad hoc networks.
VIII. BLACK HOLE ATTACK
The attacker or malicious node usually exploits some routing protocols to distribute itself as having the direct and shorter route to source whose packets it wants to grab [1] . Once the attacker adds itself between the communicating nodes, it can do anything malicious with the packets passing between them. It can then choose to drop the packets thereby creating Denial of Service attacks. Security in mobile ad-hoc network is the most vital concern for basic functionality of a network [6] . Accessibility of network services, confidentiality and integrity of data can be achieved by assuring that security issues have been met. MANETs suffer from security attacks because they possess open medium, rapidly changing topology, lack of central administration and non-robust defence mechanism. These factors lead to various security threats in mobile ad hoc networks [2] . Black hole Attacks are classified into two categories. In single blackhole attack there is only one malicious node within a zone [22] . Whereas in collaborative blackhole attack multiple nodes in a group act as malicious nodes [23] .
The work done in earlier years based on security issues i.e. attacks (particularly Black hole) on MANETs is mainly based on reactive routing protocols like AdHoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [11] . Black hole attack has been reviewed and its effects have been analyzed by studying how these attacks disturb the performance of an ad hoc network. A very little attention has been given on the impact of Black hole attack on routing protocols and comparison of vulnerability of these protocols against the attacks [7] . The goal of this work is to study the effects of Black hole attacks on reactive routing protocols i.e. Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) and Improved Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (IAODV). Black hole attacks mostly affect proactive protocols and with a great effect on AODV protocol [10, 4] . It is a type of denial of service attack in which the malicious node attracts all the packets by advertising the shortest path from it to destination to all the neighbours. Thus absorbs all the packets without forwarding them. Any node wants to transmit data first sends a Route Request message to all its neighbours including the malicious node. The malicious node is the first to reply to the source and therefore sends Route Reply quickly back to the source node. When source node receives RREP it immediately forwards packet to that path. On receipt of data the blackhole node start dropping all the incoming packets. The complete scenario is shown in figure 4. Node S is supposed to be the source node desiring to correspond with destination node, D. Firstly, node S will send a RREQ message to all its neighbouring nodes which is received by nodes i.e. nodes A, B and C. Let us assume that node A has a route to the destination so it will be the first to send a RREP message back to source node S. Before this process node M being the blackhole node, will also send a false RREP message and send it to node A with a very high destination sequence number than the destination node to the source node. So node S will assume A as the shortest path to reach the destination and send data. But this is actually malicious node and not destination. Hence all the data will be trapped. This is the part of route discovery phase. In Route Maintenance phase, if any node detects any line break or node failure, it sends a Route Error (RERR) message to all the nodes that are currently using that particular route. Black hole attack in AODV protocol can be performed in two ways [21] . Black hole attacks caused by RREP and by RREQ as discussed in table 3. 
Table3: Two ways of Black hole attack
Method to add a malicious node
The main setback of black hole attack is to hinder the communication from source to destination. To add malicious nodes in AODV the following procedure has been implemented [24] .
First we need to modify aodv.cc and aodv. ) ; } To protect MANETs from outside attacks, the routing protocols must fulfil certain set of requirements to guarantee the correct functioning of all the paths from source to destination. These are:
 Only the authorized nodes shall be able to execute route discovery processes  Negligible exposure of network topology  Early detection of distorted routing messages  Avoiding formation of loops  Avert redirection of data from shortest paths
Algorithm
Step1: Source node broadcasts RREQ to neighbours Step2: Source node receives RREP from neighbours Step3: Source node selects shortest and next shortest path based on the number of hops Step4: Source node checks its routing Step 8: Again send packet to neighbouring node
Step 9: If step 5 repeats then broadcast the malicious node as black hole Step 10: Update the routing table of source node after every broadcast Step 11: Repeat step 4 to 10 until packet reaches the destination node correctly
IX. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We have implemented Black hole attack in an ns2 simulator [15] . CBR (Constant Bit Rate) application has been implemented. The problem is investigated by means of collecting data, experiments and simulation which gives some results, these results are analyzed and decisions are made on their basis. The simulator which is used for simulation is ns2. Using ns2, we can implement your new protocol and compare its performance to TCP. To evaluate the performance of a protocol for an ad hoc network, it is necessary to analyze it under practical conditions, especially including the movement of mobile nodes. Simulation requires setting up traffic and mobility model for performance evaluation. Table 4 shows the parameters that have been used in performing simulation. 
Mobility Model
There exists a variety of mobility models proposed by Sanchez and Manzoni [25] , what we have implemented in our simulation is the random waypoint mobility model. A mobility model is used to describe the movement of a mobile node its location and speed variation over time while the simulation of a routing protocol. The random waypoint mobility model is the only model that is widely implemented & analyzed in simulation of routing protocols because of its simplicity and availability. It was first proposed by Johnson and Maltz [26] . At the start of the simulation each mobile node waits for a specified time called pause time, tp and randomly selects one location. A MN chooses a new random destination after staying at its previous position for a time period of tp till its expiry. A node travels across the area at a random speed distributed uniformly from v0 to vmax where v0 and vmax represent the minimum and maximum node velocities. This process of choosing random destination at random velocity is repeated again and again until the simulation is finished. We can say that a node is free to select its destination, speed and direction independent of the neighbor nodes.
Performance Analysis
Protocols can be compared by evaluating various performance metrics as shown below:
 Packet Delivery Ratio (Fraction)-It is calculated by dividing the number of packet received by destination through the number packet originated from source. PDF = (Pr/Ps) where Pr is total Packet received and Ps is the total Packet sent.  Average end-to end delay-It is defined as the time taken for a data packet to be transmitted across an MANET from source to destination. D = (Tr -Ts) where Tr is receive Time and Ts is sent Time.  Normalized Routing Overhead-It can also be defined as the ratio of routed packets to data transmissions in a single simulation. It is the routing overload per unit data delivered successfully to the destination node.
Experimental Setup
The simulation scenario and parameters used for performing the detailed analysis of Black hole attacks on MANET routing protocols is mentioned below. This section describes the how the performance parameters have been evaluated to simulate the routing protocols.
Following files have been used for simulation. 
Analysis using Trace Analyzer
Awk script trace analyzer is used to analyze trace output from simulation. When files are analyzed using this trace analyzer an output xgr file is created which results in the generation of graphs.
X. RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS
Using outputs from awk script following graphs and results are generated.
Packet Delivery Ratio
Simulation results of figure 6(a) show that under blackhole attack the packet delivery ratio of IAODV is more nearly similar to normal AODV, as compared to AODV under black hole attack. 
End To End Delay
Simulation results in figure 6(b) show that IAODV has less end to end delay than AODV routing protocol under black hole attack. Simulation results in figure 6 shows the average values for each parameter discussed above. It has been observed from the simulation scripts that when the protocols are under attack of black hole node, IAODV has a more packet delivery ratio, less average end to end delay and fewer overhead as compared to AODV routing protocol. It seems that IAODV is less effected than AODV whenever there is a black hole attack on the network. We analyzed that under black hole attack the PDF of IAODV is improved by larger amount of value than AODV. However, the values for average end-to-end delay are nearly similar in all the cases. Whereas there is a slight increase in the routing overhead this is quite negligible.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the Black hole attack with respect to different performance parameters such as end-to-end delay, overhead and packet delivery ratio. We have analyzed the vulnerability of two protocols AODV and Improved AODV under varying pause time. This study was conducted to evaluate the effect of Black hole attacks on the performance of these protocols. The Simulation results show that IAODV performs better Simulation can be performed using other existing parameters. This work contains simulation based on random mobility model only. Other mobility models can also be studied and behaviour of protocols can be analyzed. Such networks are open to both the external and internal attacks due to lack of any centralized security system. Black hole attacks are needed to be analyzed on other existing MANET routing protocols such as DSDV, ZRP, DSR etc. Also attacks other than Black hole such as Wormhole, passive and active attacks shall be considered. They can be classified on the basis of how much they affect the performance of an ad hoc network. The early detection of Black hole attacks as well as the exclusion policy for such actions shall be carried out for advance research.
